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Abstract— We present a new type of coordination mechanism
among multiple agents for the allocation of a finite resource,
such as the allocation of time slots for passing an intersection.
We consider the setting where we associate one counter to
each agent, which we call karma value, and where there is
an established mechanism to decide resource allocation based
on agents exchanging karma. The idea is that agents might
be inclined to pass on using resources today, in exchange
for karma, which will make it easier for them to claim the
resource use in the future. To understand whether such a
system might work robustly, we only design the protocol and
not the agents’ policies. We take a game-theoretic perspective
and compute policies corresponding to Nash equilibria for the
game. We find, surprisingly, that the Nash equilibria for a
society of self-interested agents are very close in social welfare
to a centralized cooperative solution. These results suggest
that many resource allocation problems can have a simple,
elegant, and robust solution, assuming the availability of a
karma accounting mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
The very survival and success of a society with shared
resources depends on the rules and protocols agents use to
interact with each other.
In designing the rules of these societies, there is always
a trade-off concerning centralization, efficiency, robustness,
and resiliency. A centralized system for resource allocation
needs more infrastructure and is less robust and resilient, yet
it is the most efficient. A distributed system is more resilient
and privacy-preserving.
In intelligent transportation systems, we can distinguish the
“macro” level of the fleet, and the “micro” level of the vehicles.
At the macro level, much research has shown how it is
possible to obtain a substantial improvement in the efficiency
of a transportation network [1], [2] by optimizing resource
use through cooperative approaches; that is, one takes the
perspective of a single agent which is able to control centrally
a fleet of vehicles. At the micro level there are similar resource
allocation problems. Because of the advent of self-driving
cars to be used in autonomous mobility on demand networks,
the ‘micro’ coordination problems become interesting, as we
study how the codes, customs, and conventions of human
drivers can be generalized to a scenario with both artificial
and human agents.
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Fig. 1. We propose an innovative approach to the problem of resource
allocation in a competitive setting based on the notion of “karma”, an
accounting system that summarizes the agent’s actions in the past. The
karma system allows agents to accept to give in at a particular interaction,
while receiving a karma compensation. This allows an overall more efficient
use of resources. Agents interact by meeting in pairs, e.g. {i, j}, and bid on
the resource by sending messages {mi,mj} specifying how much karma
they are willing to bid in that particular interaction. The agent with the larger
bid wins and gets access to the limited resource which in this case is access
to an intersection leading to no delay δ in travel time for the winner.
The prototypical problem is intersection management.
Deciding which car may pass first is a resource allocation
problem, in which the resource is the use of the space inside
the intersection in a given time interval. Similar resource
allocation problems happen also in maneuvers outside of
intersections, as drivers compete for the use of space, although
the outcome is not as simple as a discrete decision as in
intersection management. These interactions happen between
independent agents, with competitive goals, and typically are
not repeated, as it is rare to encounter the same vehicle again.
Therefore, there is little incentive to give in at one interaction;
at face value, this appear to be a non-repeated game.
Typical human drivers do not act like self-interested agents.
Humans have ways to communicate urgency and politely
negotiate maneuvers while they drive. Ultimately this is due
to the altruism and pro-sociality bias that evolved in our
species [3]; the bias makes the single individual intrinsically
happy to accommodate somebody who seems to be in a hurry.
Our species thrived because individuals are not completely
self-interested. When we lived in tribes, deviant antisocial
behavior was easily spotted and repressed; now that our social
groups are counted in the billions, a set of rules (laws) and
corresponding incentives (punishments) help in aligning the
individual and societal interests in the handling of common
resources [4]. When driving, some of our behaviors derive
from these incentives (we do not speed because we are afraid
of tickets), but many polite behaviors are due to our visceral
intrinsic motivation rather than extrinsic rewards/punishment.
How can we ensure that a population of artificial agents,
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such as self-driving cars, can attain the same efficiency of a
pro-social species like humans? In this paper, we consider
the problem of resource allocation in a setting that we call
Karma Game. The idea is that considerable gains can be
realized if an agent is inclined to give in at one interaction,
if it is compensated with “karma”. Thus, we introduce karma
as a way to account for an agent’s past actions. (This concept
is closer to how “karma” is used in video game mechanics,
rather than to how it is understood in Indian religions.)
We define a karma protocol with which agents can negotiate
the use of resources. The protocol describes the exchange
of bidding messages and how karma is updated based on
the outcome of the interaction. The protocol does not need a
third party, and the primitives needed to implement karma
accounting and the interaction are those provided by many
blockchains, such as Ethereum [5].
Having fixed the protocol, we study how a population
of self-interested agents will use it, by computing the Nash
equilibria for the resulting Karma game. We then compare the
Nash equilibria of the distributed system with the baseline of
the optimal centralized policies. We observe that the efficiency
of the system is remarkably similar. The social welfare is thus
closely aligned with the self-interest of the agents, assuming
the agents have reasonable discount factors. An agent that
does not care about the future and lives for the present will
also create an inefficient society.
II. RELATED WORK
a) Intersection control: Traditional intersection control
strategies have been substantially based on utilizing control
devices such as traffic lights, in which an offline optimization
based on historical data can be used to provide a control
signal [6], [7]. The main drawback of this control strategy
is that it cannot adapt to changes in request patterns and
environment. Improving upon classical control strategies,
communication-based schemes [8] are based on a competitive
scenario, in which different vehicles aim at minimizing their
own selfish cost. It is assumed that the urgency ui(t) is a
piece of private information of each vehicle i, and is therefore
not accessible to other vehicles. This kind of scenario is
typically tackled via auctions, which can be designed in order
to induce selfish agents to disclose their true urgency [9]–[16].
For example, in [9], the earliest time-slot in an intersection is
auctioned off by an intersection manager among all vehicles
at the front of each lane. In [10], having an infinite budget,
any agent in a lane can participate in a second-price auction
to enhance the winning chance of the agent at the front. In
[11], a mechanism based on a first-price auction is proposed
for the management of intersections. Two scenarios for single
intersection and a network of intersections are considered
in [12], and a policy based on a combinatorial auction for
assigning the reservations of time-space slots is presented.
However, finding the winner of a combinatorial auction is
NP-hard [17]. Finally, to schedule the intersection usage, [16]
proposes a variant of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groove mechanism
in which an intersection unit charges each agent at the front
of any lane with a time-token based on its impact on others.
We note that our approach departs from the auction-based
schemes in the mentioned papers in that to maintain the fair-
ness properties between wealthier drivers and those without
many funds, it does not require any monetary transactions, and
therefore does not require to attach an objective value to the
cost incurred by the vehicles. We will discuss later how this
sheds light on the true nature of this coordination problem.
Any vehicle is assigned an initial karma level. In light of the
budget-balance property of our mechanism, the total amount
of karma remains constant over the whole transportation
network. Also, unlike the assumption in [10], every agent is
assumed to have a limited total karma at any time period,
which neither is negative, nor exceeds a maximum value.
Almost all works in the literature which proposed an
auction-based approach for the intersection control are static,
one-time decision problems. However since the urgencies and
the agent’s private information change over time, a sequence of
decisions needs to be made, resulting in a dynamic resource
allocation and a dynamic bidding process [18]. Thus, the
utility function of each agent along with the social welfare
are defined based on the discounted utility over time. We
assume that in every interaction, vehicles are allowed to
communicate a scalar message mi(t). The karma value of
each agent is a public state ki(t). Both the outcome of the
interaction (who goes first) and the update of the public state
ki are determined based on a set of rules which are known
and verifiable to all agents (as they only depend on public
information: the states ki, kj and the messages mi,mj).
b) Karma-like concepts: A “karma” system was in-
troduced in [19] in the context of file-sharing to prevent
“freeloading” in peer-to-peer networks. In this framework,
karma represents the standing of each agent in the system, that
increases when contributing and decreases when consuming
a resource, and thereby incentivizes agents to contribute
resources [20]. In this and similar systems, the “value” of
the karma is fixed—in our approach, the agents are free to
assign a value to karma according to their goals and current
state.
c) Population games: This competitive scenario can be
modeled as a repeated game (interactions) between randomly
selected agents in a large population. For the analysis of
the resulting game, we adopt the approach that is typically
used in the study of population games [21], which has its
underpinnings in the following abstractions: 1) populations
are continuous rather than discrete; the payoffs to a given
strategy therefore depend on society’s aggregate behavior
in a continuous fashion; 2) the aggregate behavior in a
population game is described by a “social state”, which
specifies the empirical distribution of strategy choices (or
types) in the population; for simplicity, this social state is
generally finite-dimensional. The specific application that we
are considering has however some peculiarities, compared to
standard population games: for example, each agent’s type is
also determined by an exogenous time-varying signal (their
urgency). Moreover, there is no natural revision protocol or
adaptation, and therefore no evolution of the agents. We
therefore prefer to present the resulting game in a self-
contained and specialized form, without explicitly tapping
into that literature for definitions or results. Notice that the
game we are formulating is more general than the specific
traffic interaction problem, although clearly inspired by that
setup.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN A “DRIVE-BY” SCENARIO
In this section we introduce a deliberately simple model
for vehicle-to-vehicle interaction at intersections. We strove
to simplify the model to its core features, in order to isolate
the essential phenomena in this problem. We understand the
problem of vehicle-to-vehicle interaction at intersections as
an example of a “drive-by” scenario, in which:
1) There is a large number of agents in the systems.
2) Agents interact with a random schedule.
3) Each agent interacts many times with other agents over
its lifetime.
4) The value of a resource to an agent varies in time
according to an exogenous factor.
For vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) interactions at intersection:
1) There is a large number of cars on the road.
2) Cars meet randomly at intersections.
3) Each car encounters many intersections over its lifetime.
4) The value of time saved to a car varies in time according
to its urgency on that day.
A. Formalization
More formally, consider a population N of N vehicles.
Each vehicle i ∈ N has an associated urgency process ui(t).
The urgency ui at time t indicates the marginal value that
agent i gives to a unitary delay in its trip. It is an exogenous
process that is not affected by the behavior of the vehicles.
The vehicles interact at intersections. Each interaction at
time t involves only a pair of vehicles I(t) = {i, j} ⊂ N .
Every time two vehicles interact, one of the two vehicles is
necessarily delayed by a unitary delay, while the other vehicle
does not incur any delay. We therefore have two possible
outcomes o(t), that is o(t) ∈ O := {i, j}. Agent i (and,
in a completely symmetric way, agent j) incurs a cost c :
O × U → R+ that is a function of the outcome and of its
own urgency, and is defined as
ci(o, ui) =
{
ui, if o = i;
0, otherwise.
(1)
B. Assumptions
We propose the following assumptions about the model.
Assumption 1 (Randomness of encounters). The sequence
I(t) is random and identically distributed at all times t over
the set {I ⊂ N , |I| = 2}, and each vehicle has the same
probability of belonging to I(t) at a given t.
Assumption 2. The urgency processes ui(t) are identical for
all vehicles i ∈ N . The urgency at each time t is independent
and identically distributed, and takes values in U := {0, U}.
We defer the discussion on how to relax these assumptions
to Section VIII. For the most part, these assumptions are
introduced for technical convenience, as they yield a simpler
analysis, a computational advantage (see also Section VI),
and a more immediate interpretation of the results.
C. Performance measures
The focus of this paper is on policies that allow to decide
o(t) optimally, where the notion of optimality is to be defined
hereafter.
We define two measures of social cost for the entire popu-
lation, which are associated to two different interpretations.
The first measure simply quantifies the expected aggregate
cost for the entire system at each interaction:
W1 := E
[∑
`∈N c`(o(t), u`(t))
]
.
The second measure quantifies the expected rate at which the
variance (across agents) of the accumulated cost grows:
W2 = lim
t→∞E [var a(t+ 1)− var a(t)]
where
var a :=
1
N
∑
`∈N
(
a` − 1N
∑
k∈N ak
)2
and a denotes the vector of accumulated costs of the agents,
defined element-wise as a`(t) =
∑t
τ=0 c`(o(t), u`(t)). In
these expressions, E [·] represents the expectation with respect
to both the stochastic urgency processes and the interaction
selection process (which are independent processes).
D. Centralized policies
In this section, we derive the optimal centralized policies
for the simplified intersection management problem that we
presented, under the notions of social optimality that we
described. These optimal centralized policies will constitute
a baseline for the analysis of the policies that emerge in a
distributed competitive setting.
In a centralized setting, we are allowed to adopt causal
policies of the kind
o(t) = Π
(
I(t), {u(τ)}tτ=0 , {o(τ)}t−1τ=0
)
,
where by u(t), we indicate the past urgencies of all agents.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal policies for the
two social costs W1 and W2 can be computed explicitly.
Proposition 1. The social costs W1 and W2 are minimized,
respectively, by the policies
o∗1(t) ∈ arg min
`∈I(t)
u`(t) (2)
and
o∗2(t) ∈ arg min
`∈I(t)
a`(t− 1) + u`(t). (3)
If the arg min operation does not return a singleton, then
any of the two choices is optimal. Here and thereafter, we
assume that arg min ties are resolved via fair coin flipping.
We also define a third centralized policy, which prioritizes
the minimization of W1 (therefore obtaining the same value
for W1 as o∗1) and, in case of ties between the urgencies ui
and uj (where I = {i, j}), aims at minimizing the unfairness
defined by W2:
o∗1,2(t) ∈ arg min
`∈I(t)
u`(t)
and
ui(t) = uj(t)⇒ o∗1,2(t) ∈ arg min
`∈I(t)
a`(t− 1) + u`(t).
(4)
IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION USING KARMA GAMES
In this section, we formulate a mechanism for resource
allocation based on the notion of karma. We only design the
mechanism and not the agents’ policy, which is going to be
found automatically through optimization.
A. Informal definition of karma interaction mechanism
We assume that there is an integer counter ki(t) (karma)
associated to each agent bounded by kmax. The agents
exchange one message at each interaction. Each agent i can
produce a message mi which contains a value not to exceed
its current karma: 0 ≤ mi(t) ≤ ki(t).
We give this message the semantics of how much karma
the agent sees fit to bid on the current interaction. The
agent that provides the highest message is allowed to use
the resource (go first at the intersection) and must pay the
other agent up to the karma value that it has bet. The karma
transferred is reduced if the transfer would make the other
agent overflow kmax. Suppose that agent i wins betting mi.
Then the karma transferred is min(mi, kmax − kj).
Remark 1. In this paper we do not delve into the technical
implementation of such a scheme, but we would like to remark
that it is possible to implement such a scheme, in a completely
distributed way, without an arbiter to preside at each interac-
tion, by using some of the cryptographic primitives associated
to blockchain technology. The counters are implemented using
public addresses. Non-refutable messages are implemented
using cryptographic commitments. The resolution and the
outcome can be easily implemented using the primitives of,
for example, Ethereum’s Solidity language.
B. Formal definition of Karma Game
We formalize the discussion so far by defining Karma
Games in a way that is slightly more general.
Definition 1 (Karma Game in Tabular Format). A Karma
Game G is a tuple
G = 〈K,M,O,U , p, c, α, γ, φ〉,
where:
• K is a set of possible public states (karma) of an agent;
• M is a set of possible messages of an agent;
• O is a set of possible outcomes of an interaction;
• U is a set of possible exogenous states of an agent and
p is a probability distribution on U;
• c : O × U → R+ is the instantaneous cost for each
agent, which depends on the outcome of the interaction
and on the exogenous state of the agent;
• 0 ≤ α < 1 is a discount factor;
• γ : K×M×K×M→ P(O) is the interaction outcome
function, as a probability distribution on O;
• φ : K×M×K×M×O → P(K) is the state transition
function.
The interpretation is as follows. Suppose an agent of
karma ki(t) meets an agent of karma kj(t), and they
exchange messages mi(t) and mj(t). The function γ gives a
distribution on the possible outcome o(t) ∈ O given by
o(t) ∼ γ(ki(t),mi(t), kj(t),mj(t)).
As for the consequences, φ is the map that specifies the
probability distribution of the next value of ki and kj:
ki(t+ 1) ∼ φ(ki(t),mi(t), kj(t),mj(t), o(t)).
The cost for each agent is given by the following series, where
time is to be interpreted as ranging over the instants in which
the agent participated in an interaction:
C = E
[∑
t=0 α
tc(o(t), u(t))
]
. (5)
C. Vehicle interaction as a Karma Game
We now put in the form of Definition 1, the model we
described so far. K =M is the set of integers up to kmax:
K = {0, 1, 2, . . . , kmax}.
There are two possible outcomes of each interaction, as
explained in Section III: O = {i, j}. For the outcome
distribution γ(ki,mi, kj ,mj), we have
P(o = i) =

0, if m˜i > m˜j ,
1, if m˜i < m˜j ,
0.5, if m˜i = m˜j ,
where we defined m˜i = min(mi, ki).
For the state transition function φ(ki,mi, kj ,mj , o), we
have that with probability 1
ki(t+ 1) =
{
ki −min(m˜i, kmax − kj), if o(t) = i,
min(ki + m˜j , kmax), if o(t) = j.
These rules guarantee that
• the total amount of karma is conserved.
• karma is bounded above by kmax and below by 0.
The cost function c is the one already defined in (1).
V. ACTING RATIONALLY IN A KARMA GAME
We now turn attention to what is the rational behavior of an
agent in a Karma Game. An agent’s behavior is completely
defined by its policy.
Definition 2 (Agent policy). In a Karma Game, the agent’s
policy pi is a probability distribution over the possible
messages, which varies as a function of the agent’s current
urgency ui(t) and current karma ki(t):
mi(t) ∼ pi(ui(t), ki(t)).
As an agent, we need to decide what message to send for
each combination of urgency ui ∈ U and karma ki ∈ K. In
game theory jargon, we speak of a set A of different agent
“types”; in this case, A ' U × K. The traditional notion
of “agent type” does not fully capture our setting; because
following an interaction, the type of an agent changes as
they gain/lose karma. Moreover, the urgency is an exogenous
variable that nobody can predict. Still, we use “agent type”
in the following.
Under our assumptions, it is easy to compute the optimal
policy for an agent if the urgency is zero. In that case, the
optimal action for the agent is to send a message mi(t) = 0.
That is because the agent is indifferent to losing or winning
the interaction regarding the cost; and, regarding the karma,
the agent prefers to lose the interaction hoping to gain some
karma.
If an agent has a nonzero urgency, how much karma should
she bid today? This does not have an easy answer, except in
special cases. For example, if the discount factor α is zero—
the agent does not care about the future, then the optimal
policy is to send the maximum message mi(t) = ki(t). In
all other cases, we need to characterize and compute Nash
equilibria for this game. Figure 2(a) shows a representation
of such an optimal policy obtained as a Nash equilibrium.
A. Characterization of Nash equilibria for a Karma Game
To characterize the equilibrium of the game, we must
consider, in addition to the policy, a series of other related
quantities. These are:
• D ∈ P(K) is the stationary distribution of karma values.
Figure 2(c) shows a typical stationary distribution.
• T : K → P(K) is a transition function for the karma
levels; Figure 2(e) shows a representation of such a
transition function.
• c : K → R+ is the expected cost of one interaction, as
a function of the agent’s karma.
The transition function T immediately descends from
the composition of φ with the policy pi and the outcome
distribution γ, assuming the karma distribution D for the
other agents and p for all agents’ urgencies.
To express c, it is convenient to define the function
ρ(ui, ki,mi) which gives the expected utility of choosing
message mi for an agent of type ui, ki.
ρ(ui, ki,mi) =
∑
kj∈K
Dkj
∑
uj∈U
puj ·∑
mj∈M
pimj (uj , kj)
∑
o∈O
γo(ki,mi, kj ,mj)·[
c(o, ui) + α
∑
k′∈K
φk′(ki,mi, kj ,mj , o)θ(k
′)
]
. (6)
Figure 2(b) shows a representation of a typical ρ. Based
on this definition, the expected cost of an interaction is
c(ki) =
∑
ui∈U
pui
∑
mi∈M
pimi(ui, ki)ρ(ui, ki,mi). (7)
We can now define the notion of Nash equilibrium for a
Karma Game.
Definition 3 (Nash equilibrium for a Karma Game). A policy
pi is a Nash equilibrium for the Karma Game G if there exist
D,T, c that satisfy three properties:
P1: Stationarity: D is the equilibrium distribution for the
transition map T :
D =
∑
τ∈KDτT (τ).
P2: Bellman: There exists a function θ : K → R+,
representing the expected total cost for an agent as a function
of the present value of the karma, that satisfies the Bellman-
like equation
θ(k) = c(k) + α
∑
τ∈K
Tτ (k)θ(τ) (8)
for the expected interaction cost c defined in (7) and the
discount factor α.
P3: Rationality: The policy pi must yield the best expected
outcome:
C(pi) ≤ C(pi′) ∀pi′,
where C was defined in (5) and can be expressed as
C =
∑
ki∈K
Dkiθ(ki).
The next section will be devoted to the numerical compu-
tation of a Nash equilibrium for the Karma Game of interest
and to the interpretation of the resulting policies and outcome.
VI. COMPUTING NASH EQUILIBRIA OF KARMA GAMES
In general, Nash equilibria can be computed by iterative
algorithms. Starting with an initial policy, one computes the
other unknown (stationary distribution, karma utility); then
one re-computes the optimal policy. If the recomputed policy
is different from the initial one, the delta is a profitable
perturbation of the policy. Based on the perturbation, one can
make a small update of the policy, and repeat the process until
convergence. If this process converges to a distribution, then
by definition, we have found a Nash equilibrium as defined
above. However, there is in general no guarantee that the
iterative process converges.
A. Fixed point computation
We show here how to rearrange the equations to put them
in the form of a fixed point.
Suppose we have a current guess of the policy pi, the
stationary distribution D, and the utility θ.
Step 1: Compute the policy pi from the previous policy,
the stationary distribution D, and the expected utility θ. The
policy is computed using (9) based on the values of ρ obtained
from (6).
Step 2: Compute the transitions T from the policy pi
and the stationary distribution D. Given the policy and the
stationary distribution, we can compute the transitions of the
system. For each type ui, ki, we know the distribution of
the types it will encounter, and we know their policy. Thus,
we can compute the outcomes, and the consequences of the
outcomes in terms of what will be the next value of ki.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Fig. 2. For a Karma Game, the definition of a Nash equilibrium (Definition 3) involves a policy, from which one can derive the other quantities. (a):
Optimal policy as mapping from current karma level to likelihood of sending a given message m; (b) The expected utility of sending each message m as a
function of karma levels. (c) Stationary karma distribution across all agents; (d) The expected utility of possessing a certain karma level. (e) The transitions
show the likelihood of transitioning from a certain karma level to another level.
(a) Iteration #74 (b) Iteration #305 (c) Iteration #705 (d) Iteration #954
Fig. 3. Evolution of policy as the temperature decreases in the simulated annealing procedure. The policy becomes progressively more rational, until we
find a Nash equilibrium.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4. We investigate the effect of discounting future rewards. Displayed are discounting values α in the set {0, 0.3, 0.7, 1.0}. As time discounting α
increases from 0 to 1, the future is valued higher and higher and less karma is bid for the same karma levels.
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Fig. 5. Expected message value given a karma level for mixed policies
for different α discounting factors of future costs. Strategies with small
discounting factor spend almost all available karma on a message whereas
strategies with a large discounting factor save karma for the future.
Step 3: Compute the stationary distribution D from the
transitions T . This is a standard step - given a transition
matrix, compute the equilibrium distribution. It can be done
by iteration or by solving an eigenvector problem.
Step 4: Compute the expected utility θ from D and pi.
We can compute the expected utility using (8). The expected
daily cost c(k) is computed by setting α = 0 in (6).
B. Momentum and simulated annealing
We found two simple devices that make the convergence
robust, in the sense that the policy converges to the same so-
lution no matter the initial conditions of the policy, stationary
distribution, and karma utility.
1) Momentum: In Section VI-A, we have defined a way
to update the policy pi that we can abstract as a function Ψ
such that:
pinewt = Ψ(pit, Dt, θt).
Define the “momentum” τ as a scalar 0 < τ ≤ 1. Then we
update the policy as
pit+1 = τpi
new
t + (1− τ)pit.
For the set of simulations described below the optimization
parameters were constant, but we did find in general that
for different values of the model properties, the optimization
parameters had to be optimized.
2) Simulated annealing: Let T > 0 be a temperature
parameter. Rather than looking for a pure strategy, we set
pi(ui, ki,mi) ∝ exp(−ρui,ki(mi)/T ). (9)
For large values of T , agents choose a random action. As T
decreases, the agents choose more often actions with good
rewards. As T → 0, the policy tends to the deterministic
policy, where we select the maximum of ρui,ki(·):
pi(ui, ki,m)
T→0−→
{
1, if m maximizes ρui,ki(m),
0, otherwise.
In the simulations, we gradually decrease the temperature of
the system in a series of “eras” (Figure 3).
C. Equilibria parametrization in α
The parameter α introduced as a cost discounting factor
in (5) determines how much importance an agent assigns to
future costs. In the limit α 1, the agent is only occupied
with minimizing instantaneous costs. When α approaches 1,
future costs are deemed almost as important as present costs.
To determine the influence this factor has on agent policies,
we ran experiments with different α values ranging from 0
to 1 in 0.05 increments. As an overview of the effect, we
provide Figure 4 which depicts the gradual changes in policy
as α is increased. Similarly we offer Figure 5 as an overview
of the effect of time discounting on the best message to send
given a karma level.
One caveat that we have is that the Nash equilibria are
not well defined when α = 1 as some of the series in the
formalization do not converge. Still, we also include the
results of the algorithm for α = 1. Similarly, we believe that
for α → 1 there are numerical instabilities, and in fact we
find that there are much larger oscillations. Rather than tuning
the optimization parameters for each α, we keep the same
parameters, and we still picture the results for α = 0.9 and
α = 0.95, without fully believing they are Nash equilibria
for the game.
VII. POLICY COMPARISON
In this section, we are interested in gaining an empirical
understanding of different solutions to the proposed distributed
interaction problem.
a) Evaluation protocol: All simulations of interactions
follow the same general procedure. As described in Section III,
agents randomly meet in pairs and bid karma if they are urgent
in order to pass first in an intersection. All experiments were
conducted with 200 agents and a total of 1000 time periods.
On each day, there are an average of 0.1 interactions per
agent. Agents are urgent with magnitude 3 with probability
0.5 and not urgent (magnitude 0) again with probability 0.5.
Each agent has an initial karma level uniformly randomly
chosen between 0 and 12. Agents can, through interactions,
attain a minimum karma level of 0 and a maximum karma
level of 12.
In the following, we compare various policies as well as
the underlying parameters influencing the agents’ policies.
We consider two performance metrics which are finite-sample
proxies for W1 and W2, respectively:
• “Inefficiency”: This is the average cost per interaction
attained by the agent at the end of the simulation period.
Note that this is not the α-discounted factor that each
agent is trying to minimize; rather, this is the social
welfare—which roughly corresponds to the case α = 1.
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Fig. 6. Overview of efficiency and unfairness of random, centralized and
karma-based strategies. Random solutions fare the worst in both domains
whereas centralized solutions with access to all information are optimal to
their respective objectives. Karma-based solutions describe a trend of better
efficiency and fairness with increasing discount factor α up to a limit.
• “Unfairness”: This is the standard deviations of the costs
at the end of the simulation period.
b) Policies: In addition to the Nash equilibria found
for sweeping α between 0 and 1, we consider these other
policies, as they are useful reference points:
• baseline-random: The winner is decided randomly.
• bid1-always: The agents always bid 1.
• bid1-if-urgent: The agents bid 1 if the urgency is nonzero,
and zero otherwise.
• centralized-cost: The policy (3).
• centralized-urgency: The policy (2).
• centralized-urgency-then-cost: The policy (4).
c) Results: The overall results are shown in Figure 6.
baseline-random (top right) obtains the worst results, as
one might expect.
centralized-urgency-then-cost (bottom left) obtains the best
results for both fairness and efficiency, as expected.
centralized-cost does well in terms of unfairness, as it tries
to reduce the spread of the costs, but it is very inefficient.
centralized-urgency obtains minimum inefficiency (as pre-
dicted), but it does not do anything to reduce the spread of
the costs, leading to a relatively high unfairness.
The baselines provide a reference frame to interpret the
results for the karma-based policies.
We find many interesting nuggets. For example, bid1-always
is very inefficient, as inefficient as baseline-random, but it
is less unfair. This is because the karma accounting keeps
track of previous times when the agent lost, thereby slightly
reducing the unfairness even if the policy is trivial.
Next consider the performance of bid1-if-urgent. This
corresponds to a mechanism in which the agents use the
karma message to reveal their urgency. Notwithstanding the
fact that this is not an equilibrium for the game (this can be
easily verified by noting that this is not a fixed point of the
procedure discussed above), what we found surprising is that
the efficiency is not as good as some of the Nash equilibria
that we find.
Next we consider the performance of the Nash equilibrium
as a function of α. The sequence draws a hook in the
inefficiency/unfairness space. The continuity of this curve
also is good evidence that the procedure converged well (as
noted before, for α ≥ 0.9 the convergence is not assured).
We find the surprising result that for α ≥ 0.4, the Nash
equilibria are better in efficiency than the bid1-if-urgent
strategy. The reason is that the agents should bid more or
less if their karma levels allow—bidding only 1 is not the
best strategy (neither for the agents nor society). For α < 0.4,
the agents do worse.
The α = 0 “there is no tomorrow” strategy (bid everything
if urgent) is particularly bad for society, though not as bad
as random: karma still allows some reparations to be made.
We observe that for α > 0.4, the karma strategies beat
the centralized-urgency strategy in unfairness. There is a
minimum unfairness observed for α = 0.8—we are not sure
how this relates to the parameters of the problem.
In these experiments, for α = 0.85, the performance is
closest to the centralized-urgency strategy in both inefficiency
and unfairness, in fact surprisingly close.
In conclusion, we obtain the surprising result that, for
agents that are reasonably future-conscious, Nash equilibrium
strategies beat heuristic solutions in both efficiency and
fairness, and their performance is extremely close to the
centralized solutions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated how the efficient use of a shared
infrastructure can emerge from simple coordination protocols
among competitive agents, without the need of any monetary
transaction or complex decision infrastructures, in sharp
contrast to most of the literature. The enabler is the notion
of karma: a public state that links the decision of the same
agent at different times (as long as each agent reasonably
values its own future cost). A solid understanding of the
mechanisms that are necessary and sufficient for fair sharing
of an infrastructure has the potential to guide the design of
scalable solutions in many applications, and in particular for
autonomous mobility.
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